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Persistent Developmental Limits to Devising Policy 
Innovation for Innovation Policies in Emerging 
Economies
Abstract
Promising industrial profiles of Southeast Asian emerging economies 
have met their developmental limits in the face of the Asian Financial 
Crisis in the late 1990s. However, following the crisis, they have not 
been successful in upscaling the technological competitiveness of their 
industries. By applying the national innovation system approach originally 
developed in advanced western economies as an institutional mechanism 
of policy innovation in light of developmentalism, I seek to explain 
these persistent developmental limits in Malaysia and Indonesia. My 
qualitative research examines literature discussing policy coordination 
mechanisms in innovation policies and policy documents containing 
coordination mechanisms involving firms, universities, and government 
agencies; then, how these issues implicate innovation policies in the 
two countries. I employ a comparative institutional analysis between 
them focusing on institutional characteristics of the national innovation 
systems, specifically their institutional obstacles occurring within 
development paths amidst prevailing political environments. I suggest 
that persistent developmental limits in Malaysia and Indonesia result 
from systemic failures of achieving developmental aims regardless of 
their politico-administrative regimes. Existing institutional frameworks 
of the national innovation systems, entrenched in the socio-economic 
prevalence of the two countries, have not fit the nations’ developmental 
aims pursued upon innovation upgrading.
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Introduction
T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f 
institutional network involving 
firms, universities and research 
institutes, and governments is 
renowned for its essential role 
to enhance the technological 
competitiveness of industries 
in advanced economies. This 
type of institutional architecture 
comprising interactive relations 
of those actors is inherently 
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embodied in the national innovation system 
(NIS) approach, which has become prominent 
across the OECD since 1995. Nevertheless, this 
has necessarily been the case for its increasing 
manifestation in policy terms in emerging 
economies, particularly in Southeast Asia. 
Southeast Asian countries are diverse in 
many ways which prevents them from being 
generalized as a similar or simplified model of 
polity and governance (Hill, 2014). Croissant 
(2014) suggests that the variety leads to 
different outcomes of the transition of political 
institutions. The political-economic realm of 
Southeast Asian countries posits the different 
unique routes of the historical development of 
political institutions (Shair-Rosenfield, Marks, & 
Hooghe, 2014), let alone compared to their East 
Asian and Nonwestern counterparts. Among 
Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia and Indonesia 
are characterized as the middle-developing 
economies that are at the opposite political-
economic stances. The autocratic, interventionist 
and federal Malaysia has been acknowledged 
as better in managing macroeconomic policy 
than the democratic, less-interventionist, and 
decentralized-unitary Indonesia (Göbel & Maslow, 
2013; Shair-Rosenfield, Marks, & Hooghe, 2014). 
Yet, neither Malaysia nor Indonesia has 
been recognized as an entrepreneurial state or a 
developmental one (Carney and Witt, 2014). The 
two countries, however, have made institutional 
changes of the state to some extent. Both countries 
have also promoted entrepreneurship to advance 
the growth of the small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) under their condition of high 
dependency on foreign direct investment (FDI), 
low-end technology used, and pressures to face 
in regional and global free-trade competition 
(Pepinsky, 2012). 
By applying the national innovation system 
(NIS) approach as an institutional mechanism 
of the policy innovation process, Malaysia 
and Indonesia have attempted to mimic their 
East Asian counterparts in harnessing their 
economic development through innovation 
policies. Having successfully upgraded their 
technological innovation capabilities since the 
1980s, both Malaysia and Indonesia seemed 
to be the second tier of the New Industrialized 
Economies (Pepinsky, 2012). Nevertheless, 
their promising industrial profiles have met 
developmental limits in the face of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and have not 
been successful in upscaling the technological 
competitiveness of their industries since the crisis 
(Rasiah, 2011; Thee, 2006).
Persistent unsuccessful attempts of Malaysia 
and Indonesia to escalate their innovation 
capability deserves further inquiries about the 
functioning of NIS within given settings of the 
politic-administrative regimes. Notwithstanding, 
further literature on the national systems of 
innovation approach and innovation policies has 
been saturated by discourses that emphasize 
strategic interdependence of relations between 
universities, industries, and government agencies 
in distinctive business systems across countries 
but don’t necessarily include the policymaking 
processes.
With the prevalence of practical and 
theoretical problems in mind, matters of devising 
policy innovation for science & technological 
innovation policies might explain problems 
impeding any strategies of implementing research 
and technology policies used by governments, 
firms, and universities in the NIS scheme. I seek to 
address the problem by explaining Malaysia and 
Indonesia through a variety of empirical situations 
in the Southeast Asian emerging economies. 
Following the Introduction, subsequent 
parts of this article are organized to include a 
thorough examination of theoretical debates 
to address the gap therein. Next, I outline the 
research method used to acquire necessary data 
and the analysis, which are simple but suffice the 
need for figuring out the developmental limits 
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as my core explanation. Finally, I continue with 
analytically describing some evidence from each 
country resulting from data inquiries and then 
discuss them coherently to correspond to the 
theoretical debates and conclude with remarks 
that address the problem statement in the 
Introduction.
Theoretical Framework
Technological advancements to boost 
economic development in remarkable East Asian 
developmental states, which their Southeast 
Asian counterparts attempt to follow, highlight 
the importance of state-led industrializations 
compensating for market failure and export-
orientation realizations to gain desired economic 
growth (Johnson, 1982). The institutional 
framework of government-firm-university 
relations has taken a central place in the national 
systems of innovation approaches. Its complexity 
has been recognized since early studies (Edquist, 
1997; Freeman, 1987; Groenewegen & van 
der Steen, 2006; Nelson, 1993). Experiences 
of technology-heavy industrial buildings and 
developments in advanced economies have 
underpinned this sophisticated conception with 
Japan as a departing case studied by Freeman 
(1987) in formulating the approach, which can 
also be traced back to List’s (1856) “national 
system of political economy” that emphasized 
coordination of nurturing complexities of national 
productive power amidst societal conflicts in a 
developed economy. Related to the micro-level 
process, innovation dynamism at an empirical 
situation is driven by interactive learning between 
actors (Lundvall, 1992). 
All of those theorizations mentioned above 
suggest that the system of innovation approach 
has offered a new, nonlinear, and systemic lens 
in addressing innovation affairs, spanning from 
financing and managing to cluster and governing 
issues (Godin, 2009; Kastelle, et al., 2009). 
This national system of innovation approach 
implies that there are developmental limits to 
countries’ capability to achieve their desired 
developmental goals. Countries attempting 
developmentalism through a similar path to 
former Japan and Korean regimes strive to boost 
their economic development by harnessing high-
technology, knowledge-driven industrialization, 
including commercialization and export of 
the end-products to other countries, to be 
competitive against other countries in regional 
and global supply chains. This developmental 
orientation and patterns require an institutional 
setting that guarantees strict policy discipline. 
Upon possessing distinguished—monopoly or 
oligopoly—rights and concession in the industrial 
fields and marketplace granted by the government, 
the firms are obliged to achieve overarching high-
technology industrial policy goals desired by 
the government. Any underachievement would 
lead to consequences, from revoked rights and 
concessions to the disestablishment of the 
firms. The policy discipline as an ingredient is 
a glass-ceiling that any countries following this 
developmentalist path are required to put into 
effect strictly, otherwise they will suffer from 
failed efforts. Therefore, it also implies a sort 
of developmental limit, as Pepinsky (2012) 
and Carney & Witt (2014) suggest, in terms of 
insufficient institutional capabilities to achieve 
desired developmental goals within which the 
government and firms interact upon industrial 
innovation generating activities. 
Addressing the developmental limit, 
existing literature (see, for instance, Carney & 
Witt, 2014; Pepinsky, 2009; Tipton, 2009) has 
highlighted roles of the actors getting closer 
attention than working political mechanisms 
within NIS underpinning actors in playing those 
roles. Further literature on the national systems 
of innovation approach and innovation policies 
have been saturated by discourses that emphasize 
strategic interdependence of relations between 
universities, industries, and government agencies 
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in distinctive business systems across countries 
(Kastelle, et al., 2009; Sartika, 2019; Teixieira, 
2014; Zanello et al., 2015). Nevertheless, these are 
not necessarily the case in policymaking processes 
(Fagerberg, 2016; Meissner, et al., 2016). The 
numbers of policy-related studies have recently 
decreased (Teixieira, 2014). In contrast, different 
types of coordination mechanisms underpinning 
policy innovations have in particular been 
a missing issue in mainstream research on 
innovation systems and innovation policies 
(Andhika et al., 2018; Magro, et al., 2014; Watkins 
et al., 2014).
The national  innovation system is 
intrinsically political (Carayannis & Campbell, 
2014; Watkins et al., 2014), for it initially is 
conceptualized in terms of and provides an 
institutional framework for coordination and 
negotiation across actors for innovative policies 
affecting innovation policies between governments 
and firms (Metcalfe, 1997). In this regard, the state 
manifests its coordination capability by providing 
a suitable institutional framework and conditional 
support for the private sector to innovate (Wade, 
2003). 
An institutional framework serves to 
maintain policy coordination while preventing 
dilemmas of being trapped in a state predatory 
system and captured by the private sector 
(Haggard, 2015; Springer, 2009). Thus, regardless 
of the political regime types, the ability of the 
bureaucracy to enforce the private sectors 
represents specific state capacities insulated 
from the market. However, this role is also 
embedded in a constructed social system of 
institutional changes (Evans, 1995). Consequently, 
systemic innovation processes and policymaking 
activities are mutually shaping one another 
(Foxon et al., 2004). Interactions between actors 
and their institutional environment make a 
national innovation system socially embedded in 
political and economic institutions (Fagerberg & 
Verspagen, 2009). 
An orientation to collaboration between 
actors deals with formal and informal rules in an 
institutional framework that reflects knowledge 
and bargaining positions between actors in an 
innovation system (Ebner, 2008; 2016). In this 
circumstance, actors remake choices and realign 
their interests to each other by modifying the 
institutional environment to enhance economic 
performance (Bates, 2014). Applying a coherent 
national innovation system can be successful 
when coordination stems from commitments by 
and contributions from various innovation actors; 
they do not come solely from or are predominantly 
directed by a government (Cai, 2015; Boland et al., 
2012). As a collective action, interactions between 
industries, universities and research institutes, 
and government agencies in coordination and 
giving feedback to each other consequently need 
a political system that enables them to do so 
(Carayannis & Campbell, 2014).
Methods
My analysis is qualitative in nature. I employ 
literature review and policy document analysis. 
My examination departs from literature discussing 
policy coordination mechanism in innovation 
affairs and institutional networks involving firms, 
universities, and government agencies; then, I 
explain how these issues implicate research and 
technology policies undertaken by Malaysia and 
Indonesia. This leads to solidifying inferences 
derived from the literature review, which generate 
a set of identification frameworks of both similar 
and different institutional explanatory variables 
across these countries. 
I examine policy documents in various 
forms, e.g., laws and government regulations, long- 
and medium-term development planning, white 
papers on research and technology, published and 
unpublished research papers, and government 
and corporate annual or periodical reports. I 
retrieve the documents mainly from relevant 
official websites of key Malaysian and Indonesian 
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organizations responsible for undertaking science 
& technology and innovation policies. I analyze the 
contents of the documents through discerning key 
phrases repeatedly stated and patterns of ideas 
built within.
To make my explanation manageable, 
I use the theoretical framework of policy 
innovation in terms of the national systems of 
innovation approach, scrutinized in line with 
the developmentalism perspective. I employ a 
comparison between Malaysia and Indonesia 
focusing on institutional characteristics of the 
national innovation systems, their institutional 
obstacles occurring within development paths 
amidst the prevailing political environment of each 
country in the context of the empirical situation 
in Southeast Asian regional economies, and how 
research and technology policies particularly 
respond to these institutional challenges. Since 
the national systems of innovation approach 
underscores nonlinear innovation activities, 
this research scrutinizes empirical issues 
beyond boundaries of either sectoral technology 
innovations or partial innovation activities; 
however, it keeps up with prominent policy issues 
involving governments, firms, and universities 
instead. The issues include firm-university 
research collaboration policies and industrial 
cluster policies in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Results
Malaysia and Indonesia have successfully 
managed their economic recovery and further 
development after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
They have also continued being resilient, albeit 
at a slow pace, in coping with the effects of the 
2008 global financial crisis. The two countries are 
characterized as middle-income economies in the 
Southeast Asian region, which are comparable in 
political and economic stances (Göbel & Maslow, 
2013; Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2014). The working 
mechanism of national innovation systems deals 
with these empirical situations. 
Malaysia
The Malaysian national innovation system, 
in particular, has taken the advantages of a 
combination of multiple prerequisites based on 
its economic development progress, i.e. a resilient 
annual economic growth 4.2% (World Bank, 
2016a); a very competitive business climate, 
including higher education and technology 
readiness profiles, ranked 18th out of 140 countries 
worldwide (WEF, 2015); and a high position of 
global innovation at 32th out of 141 countries in 
2015 (Soumitra, et al., 2015). 
Malaysia merits a very good proportion 
of innovation sectors, between knowledge-
intensive sectors, such as electronic products, 
automotive manufacturing, telecommunication, 
and the agricultural sector, which has earned a 
very high profile of research (Rasiah, 2008; 2011). 
Through an intensifying economic liberalization 
in Southeast Asia since 1971, Malaysia has 
committed to an open economy for trade and 
foreign investment based on export-led growth 
and state-led industrialization (Carney et al., 
2009). Under the 1970s New Economic Policy 
(NEP), technology-heavy production has been a 
backbone for manufacturing industries. 
The open economy of Malaysia, through the 
escalation of knowledge-intensive exports, plays 
a significant part in regional and international 
supply-chain electronic commodities (Rasiah, 
2015). Following the intention to develop 
industrial clusters in the main regions, a science & 
technology (S&T) hub “Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC)” was built in 1995, including a subsequent 
establishment of an information & communication 
technology (ICT) hub Cyberjaya in 1999 (Evers & 
Gerke, 2015). The MSC has attracted more MNEs 
to operate in Malaysia (OECD, 2013). In addition, 
the government established the New Economic 
Model (NEM) and the Tenth Malaysian Plan (TMP) 
2011-15. Under these policies, the hub is used as 
a strategic driver to improve the performance of 
its national innovation system towards the vision 
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of an innovation-driven economic development of 
Malaysia in 2020.
Implementation strategies of research and 
technology policies are different from the stated 
Malaysian development vision. Although national 
research council and business associations 
exist, making and implementing research and 
technology policies have been undertaken by 
government agencies, state-controlled private 
bodies, and government-linked universities and 
public research institutes. While the government 
has played a dominant role in regulating and 
stimulating innovation-driven industrial 
developments, private sectors have taken the lead 
since 1996 in financing R&D activities, especially in 
their contribution to R&D in universities (Carney 
& Witt, 2014; OECD, 2013; Thiruchelvam et al., 
2011; Tipton, 2009). Yet, a deficient proportion of 
R&D expense by around a little over 1% of the GDP 
contributes to the slow increase of R&D activities 
and a very small number of granted patents. 
Malaysia has tie-in commercial and 
industrial linkages to other ASEAN countries, 
in particular Singapore, in addition to Japan, 
China, and India. With a strong focus of Malaysian 
industrial policies on FDI flow and knowledge 
spillover managed by MNEs through these 
international linkages (Cherif and Hasanov, 
2015), efforts of creating Malaysian owned 
technology innovations by low absorptive 
capacity small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
are undermined (Hashim, 2012; OECD 2013). 
Large MNEs in Malaysia do not necessarily lead 
to an effective way of knowledge and technology 
transfer to domestic firms (Thiruchelvam, 2011). 
R&D activities in MNEs are tightly conducted 
at their headquarters outside Malaysia, which 
have hindered further knowledge spillover to 
domestic firms and made the MSC fail to enhance 
interactions between multiple innovation actors 
(Evers & Gerke, 2015; Yusof, 2013). 
Approaching the ultimate achievement year 
of the Vision 2020 of Malaysia as an industrialist 
country, private sectors therein have increased 
their export. However, there have been widening 
discrepancies compared to their import volumes. 
The discrepancies might bring less harm directly 
to Malaysia’s development. Nevertheless, this 
situation could not provide incentives that attract 
MNEs to invest more in the country by relocating 
their headquarters, or at least their R&D from 
other countries to Malaysia. Overachievement 
of exports to imports also means that Malaysia 
misses its chance to contribute and benefit from 
regional and global high technology supply chains. 
Universities and public research institutes 
are still too far away from achieving mutually 
beneficial linkages with industries and continue 
to play minor roles in generating and sharing 
valuable knowledge for innovation advancements 
by industries and the government (Rasiah & Yap, 
2015; Chandran et al., 2013). They fail to translate 
the increasing publications and patents, human 
capital development policies, and collaborative 
research grants into enhanced university-industry 
linkages and improved commercialization of R&D 
results (OECD, 2013; Rasiah & Chandran, 2009). 
Moreover, Malaysia has recently suffered from a 
prolonged brain drain for more than a decade. 
While young skilful Malaysian citizens go abroad 
for study and work reasons, the local education 
system could not produce more graduates 
possessing industry-proof skills. Any industrial 
centres developed in Malaysia have not provided 
enough breeding pipeline for that purpose. 
An impediment to the Vision 2020 is 
somewhat fundamental to the developmental 
aims that Malaysia strives for. Part of the focus of 
the Vision 2020 is related to social values. Since 
coping with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
Malaysia has struggled with modernization 
and democratization. Moreover, the tagline of 
the One Malaysia indicates strong messages 
of national integration as a whole nation. The 
government has campaigned for a more inclusive 
and democratized nation. Nevertheless, the 
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special status affirmed in the Malaysian social and 
cultural policy remains the same, as it also does 
in politics, for it is embedded in constitutionally. 
The counter-inclusiveness policy and 
industrial advancements might not significantly 
relate to each other, but this creates different playing 
fields for any actors considered native Melayu 
vs. the non-natives. When it comes to achieving 
developmental aims, one might note that its former 
East Asian counterparts, especially Japan and Korea, 
were harsh in enforcing their policy discipline. 
This way, the governments impose the national 
obligations of upgrading technology-rich industrial 
developments to any firms granted special rights in 
business. Bearing the counter-inclusiveness policy 
in mind, the Malaysian government would once 
again fail to enforce that kind of policy discipline to 
firms, primarily when it deals with the state-owned 
enterprises and firms owned or powered by native 
Melayu people.  
Indonesia
Indonesia has been behind Malaysia 
in applying its national innovation system 
(Degelsegger et al., 2014; Göbel & Maslow, 2013). 
The country has neither shown innovativeness 
nor competitiveness in regional and global 
economies, despite notable economic growth 
and its political transformation (Tijaja & Faisal, 
2014; Degelsegger et al., 2014). Although it has 
successfully maintained its economic resilience 
throughout the crises, Indonesia's annual gross 
domestic product has slightly decreased from 
6.2% in 2011 to 4.8% in 2015 (World Bank, 
2016b). The country was ranked 37th out of 140 
countries on the global competitiveness scale in 
2015-2016, dropping from its previous rank of 
34 th (WEF, 2015). It was ranked 100th out of 141 
countries on the global innovation scale in 2012, 
and increased to 97th in 2015 (Soumitra et al., 
2015). All of those achievements have fluctuated 
through the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 
2008 global financial crisis to date. 
Tracing back industrialization processes, 
the rapid industrial growth in Indonesia had begun 
since the oil boom period in 1970s through trade 
liberalization and foreign investment, enabled 
by import-substituting policies toward a state-
led initiative to harness large-scale industrial 
manufacturing projects (Tijaja & Faisal, 2014; 
Thee, 2006). However, the end of the oil boom 
period in the early 1980s had forced Indonesia to 
tighten its fiscal policy in financing the previous 
initiative and begin to concentrate on export-
promotion policies in cooperation with big firms. 
As a result, offering protection, subsidies, and 
various political favours to domestic and foreign-
controlled firms have expanded exports along 
with the growing manufacturing as the leading 
technology-heavy sector at that time (Thee, 2006). 
Nevertheless, without policy discipline imposed 
on these private sectors, Indonesian economic 
growth was not sustainable in the 1990s and 
subsequently collapsed from the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis (Pepinsky, 2009; 2012). 
Indonesian import activities to date are 
superior to exports in terms of their proportion 
to the GDP; the latter still relies on natural 
resources, marking the absence in the regional 
and global supply chain of technology-intensive 
industries (Aswicahyono & Hill, 2014; Shetty et 
al., 2014). Following the initial establishment 
of the Indonesian national innovation system in 
2002 and subsequent science and technology 
policies (Lakitan, 2013), the government has 
furthermore attempted to boost its national 
economic capability through a new strategy under 
the Masterplan for Accelerating and Expanding 
Indonesian Economic Development (MP3EI) in 
2011 providing a science and technology hub for 
collaboration between universities, industries, 
and government agencies and a platform that 
enables multiple stakeholders to create industrial 
development clusters based on the primary 
economic potentials dispersed throughout regions 
(Tijaja & Faisal, 2014; Martini et al., 2012). 
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The industrial clustering problems have 
continued even though the government attempted 
institutional delineation of the innovation system 
in regional space like Indonesia’s Science and 
Technology Park (ISTP)/ PUSPITEK built in 1976, 
the new Bandung Raya Innovation Valley (BRIV), 
as well as the existing “Jabodetabekjur” regional 
collaboration which are also still fragmented 
(Soenarso et al., 2013; Yananda et al.,2017). The 
Jabodetabekjur comprises interlinkage across 
Greater Capital Territory Jakarta, and adjacent 
cities and regencies: Bogor, Depok, Tangerang 
(and the new formed Tangerang Selatan), and 
Cianjur; and this regional cooperation has proven 
unsuccessful to date in coping with urban socio-
economic challenges in this megalopolitan region. 
Therefore, this large-scale, cross-territorial 
cooperation failed to provide a conducive eco-
system for breeding prosperous technology and 
innovation. It has not come close to solving its 
fundamental problem, for which it was formed 
in the first place.
The efficacy of Indonesian NIS is once 
suggested by Lakitan (2013) since problems of 
the Indonesian national innovation system occur 
at all aspects within the national innovation 
system, from policy, actors, to institutional 
environments. However, further examination 
below proves further macro- and micro-conditions 
of low effectiveness of the Indonesian national 
innovation system to harness science, technology, 
and innovations. 
A thorough examination at the macro-level 
of the Grand Plan of National Research (Rencana 
Induk Riset Nasional, RIRN) 2017-2045 also 
elucidates indicative policy failures by design. 
The RIRN provides a sophisticated platform for 
the government to provide institutional directions 
for enhancing research within the prevalence of 
persistent industrial backwardness in Indonesia 
(Kemristekdikti RI, 2017). 
First, the remaining routine five-year 
medium-term national development plan system 
was inherited from the former authoritarian New 
Order Regime to the early period of the Reformist 
Regime. The remaining system was undertaken 
within a context of competing agendas: multiple 
dimensions of public sector reform, economic 
recovery and growth efforts, and the struggle for 
an exit strategy from prolonged tightening up of 
loans from international donor organizations. 
The situation deteriorated the position of the 
science and technology sector from primary to 
supporting; thereby the sector is less prioritized. 
Subsequent improvement of the systemic national 
development planning had driven the government 
to bring science and technology to the fore, making 
it no longer a single sector among others, but 
embedded in the whole, integrated mainstreaming 
national development agenda until 2009. Only 
since then, the national innovation system and 
subsequently regional innovation system have 
been introduced.
Second, the national innovation system 
could not escape from an inconsistency of logics 
throughout the iterative improvement of the 
national development planning system. The New 
Order Regime use the national general guidance 
(Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) to 
secure coherence of the national development 
system. The Indonesian government in the 
reform era embraces the development direction 
determined by the winning presidents upon direct 
elections. This determination makes discontinuity 
issues of prioritization of science, technology, and 
innovation within development planning from 
presidential periods to another. 
Third, the logic inconsistencies have 
also happened due to ongoing fragmented 
development policies. For example, in 2015 the 
recent administration provided the government 
regulation No. 14 concerning the grand plan of 
the national industrial development (rencana 
induk pembangunan industri nasional, RIPIN) 
2015-2035. However, alongside this grand plan, 
the government has mainstreamed the human 
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resource development agenda without a proper 
and appropriate plan with the RIPIN. According to 
the facts, it has boosted infrastructure development 
in the vast regions of the country funded by foreign 
loans with neither any strategies of incoming 
technology transfer nor coherent relations with 
the sixteen economic stimulus packages. Very 
recently, the development also gets confused with 
the separation between the Ministry of Education 
and Culture (Kemdikbud, currently reorganized 
as the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research 
and Technology/Kemdikbudristek), to which 
the Directorate General of Higher Education 
(Dikti) attached, and the National Research and 
Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi 
Nasional/BRIN), which was the co-agency with 
the former Ministry of Research, Technology, 
and Higher Education (Kemristekdikti, currently 
merged to the Kemdikbud). 
Amidst those confusing changes mentioned 
above, the government has maintained a 
hierarchical mechanism in coordinating research 
and technology policies with business associations 
and the national research council. It has also set 
public universities back under its subordination 
with the status of public service working agencies. 
The regulatory frameworks prevent them from 
having flexible resource managements despite the 
opportunities for public universities to generate 
their resources after recent higher education 
reforms in the late 1990s (Moeliodihardjo et al., 
2012). In practice, the government maintains roles 
in regulating and financing, while MNEs keep their 
marketing and operation in Indonesia without 
enabling knowledge flow from their R&D overseas 
to domestic firms (Kuncoro, 2012). 
At the micro-level, the R&D in universities 
and public research institutes have relied on a 
meager allocation of the government budget. At 
the same time, private sectors allocated a lower 
profile of budget for R&D (Soenarso & Sadewo, 
2014) while the total expenditure of all sectors 
for R&D remains below 1% of the GDP (OECD, 
2013). The cooperation between universities 
and industries also remains low and poor to both 
sides. Multiple governments’ schemes of research 
grants encouraging collaborative research and 
utilizations for universities and industries become 
ineffective in this matter due to the incoherence 
of the government policy and the unconducive 
regulatory framework to the need of sustained 
resource management and further collaboration 
(Moeliodihardjo et al., 2012; Putera & Jannah, 
2012). Recent business permit and investment 
service reforms implemented by the government 
have also not sufficed to improve the ease of doing 
business (Shetty et al., 2014). 
Discussions
The findings of empirical evidence in 
Malaysia and Indonesia prompt an understanding 
that innovation as a systemic process implies its 
scope of dealing with complex circumstances, 
in which different economic activities, policy 
fields, and multiple actors coexist. The systemic 
process results from established socio-economic 
behaviours and activities shaped by constraints 
and incentives provided by an institutional 
framework primarily at the national level. 
Nelson (1993) also explains its delineation 
of the framework at the regional level. This 
understanding fills in gaps which many analyses 
of NIS in empirical situations have paid little 
attention to institutional environments underlying 
the complexity of interplay actions between 
actors, and have furthermore undermined the 
determination of institutional frameworks and 
industrial structures to economic performance of 
firms and national competitiveness, as formerly 
suggested by Edquist (1997; 2005).
At the very macro-level, different politico-
administrative regimes have shaped varied 
overarching economic development goals. 
Nevertheless, these various political-economic 
constellations have not prevented them from 
ending up with similar institutional shortcomings 
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that underpin the working mechanism of their 
national innovation systems, respectively. 
Within the politico-administrative regimes in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia’s federal system 
cannot facilitate a better business environment 
for MNEs to invest in R&D activities linked to 
universities alongside their business services 
therein. It is quite the opposite to see that Indonesia 
has recently exerted more centralized authorities 
when it comes to conforming with open-market 
policies, undermining the local autonomy policy for 
about two decades. This centralization of authority 
under the national government's foundation seems 
to be failing to address important challenges in 
implementing the NIS. 
Neither Malaysian nor Indonesian NIS 
institutional designs can be helped. Considering 
nonlinear and multidirectional characteristics 
of the NIS approach that take place therein, 
innovative policy coordination mechanisms in 
Malaysia and Indonesia do not address whole 
comprehensive innovation processes in line 
with their varied developmental goals. There 
is a grand plan of science, technology, and 
innovation embedded in the national development 
plan. However, they contain no comprehensive 
approach and strategies providing linkage across 
government sectoral departments, industries, 
and universities. Moreover, consistencies of those 
development orientations remain in question, 
leaving the development plan unable to assure 
simultaneous action plans for implementation 
by multiple actors outside government agencies. 
Malaysia and Indonesia have suffered from 
the lack of proper institutional arrangement to 
cope with the side effects of previous economic 
policies (Basri, 2013; Hill et al., 2012). In addition, 
an impediment to the growth of innovation 
and entrepreneurship comes from the state 
regulations that create a high barrier to market 
entry (Touchton, 2015), while any significant 
efforts to ensure the regulations are effectively 
enforced are missing. 
Against considerable economic growth 
of Southeast Asian middle-income economies, 
policymakers have seemed to attempt to make 
credible commitments with firms and investors 
that compensate adequate political institutions 
in enforcing the rule of law (Touchton, 2015). 
However, problems in applying the national 
innovation systems in the two countries persist, 
for they are reinforced by the prolonged 
Malaysian political transition (Ufen, 2013) 
and the entrenched political stagnancy in the 
Indonesian state institutions (Mietzner, 2015). 
Compared to East Asian economies, which are 
successfully advancing innovation capacities 
within global commodity chains, it is typical 
of Southeast Asian middle economies to have 
institutional arrangements constrained by 
coalitional demands in addressing the systemic 
vulnerability of a country's economy (Doner 
et al., 2005; Pepinsky, 2009). Moreover, in this 
situation, actors in Malaysia and Indonesia miss 
a systemic policy coordination mechanism and 
lack linkages and collaborations in responding 
to a complex policy environment effectively. The 
circumstances, therefore, go broadly to cope with 
a failure by the design of innovation system and 
innovation policies.
Persistent developmental limits related to 
the upscaling of technological competitiveness 
and economic development in Malaysia and 
Indonesia result from systemic failures of 
achieving developmental aims. These problems 
are entrenched in institutional settings of 
coordination mechanisms of policy innovation in 
the two countries. 
Conclusion
My analyses of empirical features explain 
that coordination mechanisms of the national 
innovation system (NIS) and logical inconsistencies 
of the underpinning national development plans 
become persistent developmental limits to 
devising policy innovations for fruitful science, 
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technology, and innovation policies. Specifically, 
the states' interventions in Malaysia and Indonesia 
have predominantly played roles over the market 
and other governance actors, albeit pretended 
to be government-firm cooperation and open 
economies that ought to make policy innovation 
actors internationally connected.
In sum, existing institutional frameworks 
of the NIS, which are entrenched in the socio-
economic prevalence of Malaysia and Indonesia, 
have not fit the nations’ developmental aims or 
pursued innovation upgrading. Consequently, my 
whole argument explains persistent developmental 
limits to these emerging economies at macro-and 
micro-levels of the NIS, regardless of their politico-
administrative regimes. 
The argument also explains why typical 
Southeast Asian economies have always stuck 
to high dependence on innovation transfer from 
advanced nations, as Zanello, et al. (2015) and 
Chen (2014) outlined. Innovations modified and 
diffused in these countries fail to meet the local 
needs. Their ability to innovate also declines due 
to unconducive institutional environments and 
political-economic structural problems that lower 
the ability of actors to innovate. 
C o p i n g  w i t h  c h a n g i n g  p o l i t i c a l 
environments, all countries need to develop their 
economies through coordination mechanisms 
underpinning policy innovations. The policy 
innovations in this regard need advancing 
preconditions and augmented requirements 
beyond industrial policies and need to escape 
from debatable choices of types of regimes 
ranging between appropriate state intervention 
and market-oriented development in a context of 
government-business relations, reaffirming Evans 
(2011), Haggard (2015), and Kohli (2004). Thus, 
this concern raises a need for a further translation 
into a coherent institutionalized government-
business relation embedded in a social system 
that affects technological innovation for economic 
development.
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